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Remarks by Professor David Lange* 
ABSTRACT 
Remarking on the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances 
at the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law’s 
Symposium, From Berne to Beijing, Professor Lange expressed general 
misgivings about exercising the Treaty Power in ways that alter the 
nature of US copyright law and impinge on other constitutional rights.  
This edited version of those Remarks explains Professor Lange’s 
preference for legislation grounded squarely in the traditional 
jurisprudence of the Copyright Clause, the First Amendment, and the 
public domain, and his preference for contracting around established 
expectations rather than reworking default rules through treaties.  It 
continues by exploring the particular costs associated with the Beijing 
Treaty’s expansion of moral rights into US copyright law. Those 
expanded rights, viewed in light of previous legislative and judicial 
expansions of traditional US copyright principles, threaten to erode 
certain portions of the public domain and the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.  Recognizing that additional rights for some result 
in a loss of rights for others, these Remarks invite critical reflection on 
the costs and benefits of the Beijing Treaty, “copyright restoration,” and 
other well-intentioned alterations to the status quo.  
 
I thank the editors of the Journal for their kind invitation to 
speak today. 
 
 *  David Lange is the Melvin G. Shimm Professor of Law at the Duke Law School. His 
remarks have been prepared at the kind invitation of the Editors of the Vanderbilt Journal of 
Entertainment & Technology Law, on the occasion of the Journal’s Conference, From Berne to 
Beijing, held at the Vanderbilt Law School, Friday, January 25, 2013.  Professor Lange spoke as a 
member of the Conference’s Panel on the Film Industry. 
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And I congratulate Justin Hughes, SAG/AFTRA, and the MPAA 
on their success in Beijing, and especially on the signing of the Beijing 
Treaty last summer.1  I am sympathetic to the struggles faced by actors 
and performers everywhere, and nowhere more so than in the 
audiovisual arts. 
In truth, though, I do have some misgivings about treaties of this 
sort—that is to say, treaties that alter the nature of US copyright law 
generally, but more especially those that elevate the importance of 
moral rights by giving them a more prominent place in US law than 
they have customarily had.2 
I can say why in a few sentences: I generally prefer contracts to 
laws of universal application.3  I think moral rights that presume to 
limit new authors’ expression by restricting otherwise permissible use 
of works under copyright or in the public domain—for example under 
doctrines of fair use or parody—are troublesome in a constitutional 
setting like ours.  When it comes to protecting rights in creative 
expression, I prefer legislation still grounded squarely in the traditional 
jurisprudence of the Copyright Clause, the First Amendment, and the 
public domain, as against a more substantial de facto role for the Treaty 
Power and the Commerce Clause.4  I think the US experience with 
multilateral treaties since Berne has made it clear that we may sacrifice 
some of what is exceptional and valuable in our own culture in order to 
harmonize our laws with others in the pursuit of global commerce.5  And 
I resist casting aside settled expectations in any industry for the sake 
of change, however appealing that change may seem to be.  I am not 
adamant as to any of these points, save for the question of creative 
expression.  I merely share with Edmund Burke an inclination to think 
that change very often does not prove to be quite as appealing when the 
smoke clears and the costs are counted. 
Whether these reservations may prove to be warranted in the 
case of the Beijing Treaty remains to be seen.  Of course there are bound 
 
 1.  Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, World Intellectual Property 
Organization, June 24, 2012, AVP/DC/20 [hereinafter Beijing Treaty], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=295837. 
 2.  See, e.g., id. art. 5 (granting performers rights of attribution and integrity, even 
following a transfer in copyright ownership, among other things). 
 3.  See, e.g., Matthew Rushton, Global Justice at a Crossroads, 63 INT’L B. NEWS 14 
(2009) (“The very notion of universal application of laws . . . is ‘fascinating to everyone, a pipedream 
to many, an aspiration to many and a nightmare for others.’” (quoting Professor David Crane, 
former chief prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone)). 
 4.  See generally DAVID LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009). 
 5.  See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 893 (2012); see also David L. Lange, Risa J. 
Weaver & Shiveh Roxana Reed, Golan v. Holder: Copyright in the Image of the First Amendment, 
11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 83 (2011). 
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to be questions: Is the definition of a “performer” sensible in a medium 
in which any day now someone is sure to film World War II with the 
original cast?6  Should the term of protection really reach back fifty 
years?7  Will it eventually reach back further?8  And so on.  But for the 
moment—again with one exception—the treaty seems benign enough 
on its face. 
That exception is in its concern for moral rights which, as I say, 
may survive or stand apart from copyright in ways that can impede 
other authors’ use of an actor’s work.  It is most troubling once the work 
is (or otherwise would be) in the public domain.9  As in the case of Article 
6bis of the Berne Convention, concerns of this sort are 
understandable.10  But at least in my own opinion they are potentially 
at odds, in a conceptual sense, with the Copyright Clause’s “limited 
times” provision, with the even more important (and antecedent) claims 
the public domain should bring to bear on every work of expression, 
and, most importantly—in a constitutional sense—with the First 
Amendment.11 
And here, I suppose, is just where the thrust of my own remarks 
necessarily begins.  For nearly everything I have just presupposed by 
implication about the Copyright Clause, the First Amendment, and the 
public domain has been set at sixes and sevens, perhaps beginning with 
the Uruguay Round of the GATT in 1986,12 but surely with our 
adherence to the Berne Convention in 1989,13 and culminating in two 
cases decided within the past decade—each of them a muddled 
reflection of our effort to secure a wider place among the copyright 
nations of the world.14 
Our experience has been that sometimes a multilateral treaty 
can carry us too far.  That can happen because the treaty itself (or some 
part of it) is a bad idea, or at least inconsistent with the traditions of 
our culture.  It might also happen because the idea is badly 
 
 6.  Beijing Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2. 
 7.  Id. art. 14; see generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 8.  See generally Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873.   
 9.  See generally Lange et al., supra note 5. 
 10.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, 
September 9, 1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, 
completed at Berne on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26, 
1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended on Sept. 28, 
1979, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html.  
 11.  See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 4, at ix. 
 12.  Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
 13.  Berne Convention, supra note 10. 
 14.  See generally Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186, 194 (2003). 
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implemented in the course of enabling legislation.  And when something 
like that presents itself, precedents can follow that are  
ill-judged and even destructive.15 
Two pieces of legislation prompted by our adherence to treaties 
illustrate the first problem, which arises particularly when the Treaty 
Power and the Commerce Clause take center stage, casting a shadow 
over the Copyright Clause.16  One is the so-called Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act of 1998 (SBCTEA), which added twenty years to 
the terms of copyrighted works in the United States.17  The other is the 
so-called Copyright Restoration Act (the “URAA”), which conferred US 
copyright protection upon millions of foreign works that had fallen into 
the public domain in this country—sometimes for reasons grounded in 
a failure to comply with no-longer-applicable formal prerequisites to US 
copyright, and sometimes because the proprietors of the foreign works 
simply did not seek or even want US protection.18  The Supreme Court 
upheld both Acts against objections grounded in the Copyright Clause, 
the First Amendment, and the public domain.19 
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, Justice Ginsburg, writing for a majority, 
approved the SBCTEA.20  From the majority’s analysis, the Copyright 
Clause offers few constraints against Congressional discretion as to 
term limits.21  As for the First Amendment, copyright contains its own 
doctrinal safeguards against encroachments upon freedom of 
expression; as long as copyright’s “traditional contours” (in her usage of 
the phrase, the idea-expression dichotomy, and fair use) remain in 
place, heightened First Amendment scrutiny is not required.22 
Meanwhile, last year’s decision in Golan v. Holder upheld the 
URAA.23  The loss to the public domain seemed harsher and more stark 
in Golan than it had in Eldred.  The URAA meant (among other things) 
that some persons, who had relied on the public domain status of earlier 
 
 15.  See generally Lange et al., supra note 5. 
 16.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, 
cl. 8. 
 17.  Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 3287 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
301 (2012)). 
 18.  Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
 19.  See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192–94. 
 20.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194. 
 21.  See id. at 218 (“For the several reasons stated, we find no Copyright Clause 
impediment to the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights.”); see also id. at 223 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 22.  Id. at 221 (“But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional 
contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.” (citing Harper 
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987))). 
 23.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 875, 894. In Justice Ginsburg’s usage of the phrase, such 
“traditional contours” consist of the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use. Id. at 890. 
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works in creating derivative works of their own, now faced either the 
unexpected payment of royalties for their continuing use of the restored 
works, or else the forfeiture of their right to exploit the derivative works 
they had created.24 
In Golan, once again, Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the 
majority.25  In some part, as she herself insisted, her opinion in Golan 
merely reiterated what she had written in Eldred.26  “Concerning the 
First Amendment,” she wrote, “we recognized [in Eldred] that some 
restriction on expression is the inherent and intended effect of every 
grant of copyright.”27  Assuming copyright’s traditional safeguards, and 
assuming content neutrality (as the parties in Golan, like the parties in 
Eldred, had conceded), the prospect of a particular role for the First 
Amendment is effectively precluded.28 
Likewise, her opinion in Golan echoes what she had said in 
Eldred about the Copyright Clause.  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion reads 
that Clause to confer what is now essentially unreviewable discretion 
upon Congress to deal with copyright as it thinks best.29  Absent some 
“misbehavior” (her word, not mine), the Clause has no significant role 
to play in reviewing that discretion.30 
In one respect, however, her opinion in Golan goes much further 
than anything she had seemed to say in Eldred.  For most copyright 
practitioners and scholars, the public domain has been thought to be 
essentially inviolate.31  Indeed, in Eldred it appeared that members of 
the Court who addressed the subject at all during oral argument also 
assumed that Congress was not free to withdraw works from the public 
domain, and that it was important in a constitutional sense that the 
SBCTEA did not propose to do so.32 
 
 24.  See id. at 878 (“Petitioners include orchestra conductors, musicians, publishers, and 
others who formerly enjoyed free access to works § 514 removed from the public domain.”). 
 25.  Id. at 877. 
 26.  See generally Eldred, 537 U.S. 186. 
 27.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889. 
 28.  Lange et al., supra note 5, at 122. 
 29.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (“[W]e explained, the Clause 
‘empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body's 
judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause.’” (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222)). 
 30.  See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 873 (“But as in Eldred, such hypothetical misbehavior is far 
afield from this case.”); Lange et al., supra note 5. 
 31.  See Tyler T. Ochoa, Is the Copyright Public Domain Irrevocable? An Introduction to 
Golan v. Holder, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 123, 124 (2011) (“Traditionally, the copyright public 
domain has been considered irrevocable.”). 
 32.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at *17, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 
01-618), available at http://www.aaronsw.com/2002/eldredTranscript (“it does take a lot of things 
out of the public domain that one would think that someone in Congress would want to think hard 
about”); Lange et al., supra note 5, at 98. 
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But Golan makes it appear that these assumptions have been 
unwarranted.  In a narrow sense, to be sure, Ginsburg’s opinion merely 
upheld the URAA, where at least the works are of foreign origin and 
have never enjoyed a full term of copyright protection in the United 
States.33 All such works are now free to enjoy the protection they would 
have secured if they had behaved from the beginning as US copyright 
proprietors were obliged to do in order to secure protection.34 
From another perspective, however, the URAA confers benefits 
upon millions of works whose US counterparts remain, at least for the 
time being, in the public domain.35  In this sense, the URAA privileges 
foreign works above works with US origins.  But if that is so, how long 
can we expect that distinction to hold effect?  Could Congress withdraw 
US works from the public domain on grounds identical to those in the 
URAA—or for other reasons now within the reach of Congressional 
discretion?  Could Congress even imaginably withdraw works that have 
enjoyed a full term of protection? 
To the surprise of many who have read Ginsburg’s opinion in 
Golan, even the last extreme proposition does not seem entirely  
far-fetched now.  Though she does not quite say so in explicit terms, she 
is at pains not to preclude the idea altogether.36  Withdrawals obviously 
calculated to avoid the limited times provision of the Copyright Clause 
might conceivably amount to impermissible “misbehavior” (again, her 
word, not mine); but, something less than that would not necessarily 
cross any forbidden lines at all.37  It would not matter that the effect of 
such withdrawals might not serve as an incentive to the creation of new 
works; Justice Ginsburg’s opinion elevates distribution and other 
exploitation of works to a status on par with the creation of new works 
as worthy goals for Congress to pursue through the Copyright Clause.38  
Ultimately, the question of wholesale restoration would raise questions 
for Congress to resolve.  But the Clause presumably would not forbid 
 
 33.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878; 17 U.S.C. § 514 (2012). 
 34.  See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878 (“Works encompassed by § 514 are granted the protection 
they would have enjoyed had the United States maintained copyright relations with the author's 
country or removed formalities incompatible with Berne.”).  
 35.  Id. (“As a consequence of the barriers to U.S. copyright protection prior to the 
enactment of § 514, foreign works “restored” to protection by the measure had entered the public 
domain in this country.”). 
 36.  See generally Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873. 
 37.  Id. at 875 (“But as in Eldred, such hypothetical misbehavior is far afield from this 
case.”). 
 38.  Id. at 876 (“The creation of new works, however, is not the sole way Congress may 
promote ‘Science,’ i.e., knowledge and learning.”). 
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it.39  The First Amendment would remain irrelevant.40  The public 
domain itself may simply be without “constitutional significance.”41 
The effect of these two cases, but particularly Golan, is to 
recognize the broadest Congressional latitude with respect to copyright 
legislation ever conceded by the Court.  The breadth of that concession 
is remarkable in an absolute sense, and nothing less than stunning to 
those who have supposed (it now appears erroneously) that the 
Constitution must have some role to play in constraining Congress in 
this field. 
I would respond now by saying that the Constitution does 
remain relevant, but not in the sense that we might have expected.  
Thanks to the siren call of global commerce and multilateral treaties, 
the constitutional emphasis has shifted.  We may go on saying that we 
care about creative expression, and in some newly constricted sense, no 
doubt we do.  But thanks to Justice Ginsburg we are obliged to care 
considerably more about the politics of global commerce under the more 
distant auspices of the Treaty Power42 and the Commerce Clause.43 
Every effort in the direction of multilateral harmony results in 
at least some adjustment in the marginal costs of creative expression.  
That is not necessarily bad.  But neither is it necessarily a win-win 
situation.  Add twenty years to the term of copyright and someone 
downstream pays or loses.  Restore copyright in millions of foreign 
works, and again someone pays or loses.  Add performance rights in the 
recording or film and television industries, retroactive across some fifty 
years, and yet again someone must ante up what someone else will now 
pocket.  But these consequences, and others like them, are relatively 
manageable concerns, even in my own assessment.  A treaty merely 
picks up where a contract leaves off (or is muscled aside).  The smaller 
economic effects may remain debatable at some abstract level.  It seems 
unnecessary to worry about the Beijing Treaty in these terms just now, 
however, especially if the film industry itself approves. 
What I do care about myself is freedom of expression.  And there 
really is no question that in consequence of each of the first two  
 
 39.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (“[W]e explained, the Clause 
‘empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body's 
judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause.’” (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 
(2003))). 
 40.  See generally Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889–94. 
 41.  Id. at 888 n.26 (“The dissent also suggests, more tentatively, that at least where 
copyright legislation extends protection to works previously in the public domain, Congress must 
counterbalance that restriction with new incentives to create. Even assuming the public domain 
were a category of constitutional significance, we would not understand ‘the Progress of Science’ 
to have this contingent meaning.” (citations omitted)). 
 42.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 43.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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real-life scenarios I have just described there will be some expression 
that simply will never see the light of day.  Some author’s estate will 
hold on to the rights in their decedent’s work for sentimental reasons 
entirely understandable in themselves, but with the result that the 
works will have lost their value altogether at the end of the extra twenty 
years.44 The eponymous petitioner in Golan wanted to use the works of 
Shostakovich in order to introduce inner-city schoolchildren to classical 
music; but he lacked the money to clear those rights, and so his plans 
languished.45  I suppose it is too soon to say how the performers’ rights 
envisioned in the Beijing Treaty will play out against concerns like 
these, but for the time being I will assume the best. 
But these worries are small when considered against the 
possibilities that we now face after Golan.  Imagine a surge in the 
direction of “copyright restoration” for works long thought to be free 
from copyright protection.  This is the latest threat to the public domain, 
and it is far more serious than any that has gone before.  It has followed 
in no small part from our preoccupation with global commerce and 
harmonization; from our commitment to ill-judged and unnecessary 
legislation, urged on mainly by the copyright industries; and with the 
support in turn of a Court that gives no evidence of understanding the 
issues in terms that take us much beyond the realms of commerce, and 
Congressional discretion unfettered by anything but politics at large. 
When it comes to wholesale withdrawals of works from the 
public domain, I cannot think we would have envisioned anything quite 
as obviously destructive to freedom of expression at the outset of the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986.  
I think it would still have seemed unlikely in 1989, when the United 
States adhered to the Berne Convention.  I am not sure it would have 
been imaginable prior to the ratification of the TRIPS Accords in 
Marrakech in 1994, when the WTO stepped into the picture.  But at 
some point along the way we lost our bearings.  We no longer know who 
we are–or rather, who we were.  The implications for the future of 
creativity and expression are in no sense reassuring. 
But you will ask: where is the particular risk for the motion 
picture industry in all of this?  Let me respond to this entirely legitimate 
challenge in two brief points. 
First, in the initial stages of creative development and  
pre-production for any given film, the industry depends upon access to 
 
 44.  Consider the late John D. MacDonald’s “Travis McGee” series, among others. See 
LANGE & POWELL, supra note 4, at 94–95. 
 45.  See Lange et al., supra note 5, at 88; see also Rich Bailey, Lawrence Golan Speaks 
About Golan v. Holder and His Fight to Protect the Public Domain, TECHDIRT (Oct. 7, 2011, 8:00 
AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111006/12220616236/lawrence-golan-speaks-about-
golan-v-holder-his-fight-to-protect-public-domain.shtml. 
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the public domain.  Sequels and remakes: each may look to the public 
domain from time to time; but they are not at the center of the looming 
problem for the industry.  It is in such adaptations as Les Misérables46 
or Anna Karenina,47 for example, that we can see the dilemma most 
clearly.  Restore the underlying works in films like these to current 
copyright protection, and you may well have removed one of the year’s 
leading Academy Award-nominated pictures from the realm of 
existence altogether. 
Imagine negotiating with the heirs of Victor Hugo for film rights 
in Les Misérables.48  Early negotiations leading toward Les Misérables 
might preclude the development of the film altogether; this would be a 
loss to the public, and a disappointment to the would-be producers, 
though still relatively inexpensive.  But (taking the parameters of the 
URAA as a model) it would approach the dimensions of a catastrophe 
should restoration arise after the film has been completed and is in 
release, especially prior to recoupment.  Films do recoup, studio 
accountants to the contrary notwithstanding; but it can take a while.  
Cash flow cycles are long in the film business, and the fully allocated 
profit margins are often thin, even when a single film succeeds on its 
own.  So the prospect of destructive intervening rights arising from 
unanticipated restoration after release and distribution is not  
far-fetched. 
Does the Beijing Treaty threaten the film industry in similar 
fashion?  Not on the face of it; at least I do not think so.  But once its 
prospective benefits are firmly fixed in place, will we not need to 
consider all those actors trapped in limbo in films fixed more than fifty 
years ago?  Should we not consider restoring rights to them as well?  
How about Margaret O’Brien?  Surely, she deserves restored 
performance rights for her role as Tootie in Meet Me in Saint Louis in 
1944.49 
I do not see how claims like hers can go unraised.  I do not see 
how they can go unanswered either, except as yet another exercise in 
 
 46.  LES MISÉRABLES (Universal Pictures 2012). 
 47.  ANNA KARENINA (Universal Pictures 2012). 
 48.  That is not at all far-fetched. His heirs actually attempted to assert rights in France, 
though they were rebuffed under French law. Kim Willsher, Heir of Victor Hugo Fails to  
Stop Les Mis II, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/31/ 
books.france.  
 49.  Remember her in the Halloween scene, just after she’s thrown a bag of flour in the 
face of old Mr. Geezer down the street? Her eyes widen at the unexpected acclaim of all the older 
children gathered around the bonfire who dared her on, never believing for a moment that  
Tootie—little Tootie!—would take up their challenge. In all of film’s rich history, it stands as one 
of childhood’s supreme moments of self-recognition as she comes to terms with what this 
accomplishment says about her personality and character: “I’m the most horrible!” MEET ME IN 
ST. LOUIS (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1944).  
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politics.  This is where our investments in treaties and commerce have 
brought us, guided along the way by a Supreme Court to which both 
creativity and freedom of expression are little more than mere 
abstractions.  And do bear this in mind as well: the Beijing Treaty is 
not just about money and credit; it is also about an understanding of 
moral rights that confers upon every performer the power to limit 
modifications in their performances that “are objectively prejudicial to 
the performer’s reputation in a substantial way.”50  I don’t know exactly 
what that means; but if it adds anything at all, then it adds rights that 
are not there now.  Additional rights for some result in a loss of rights 
for others. 
Ah, well.  Perhaps I take too dark a view of what we are gathered 
here to celebrate.  Perhaps the Beijing Treaty will prove to be a victory 
for actors and studios alike.  I hope very much that it will.  If it does it 
will be the answer to a long-held dream. 
That is a pretty thought.  As those of us who love movies and the 
film business know, a dream is a wish your heart makes.51  And yet that 
brings to mind another fable, with which I will conclude my remarks at 
last.  I expect you will all remember it.  It is a story in which a wise 
Mother Bear says to her son, who has been pursuing his own dreams, a 
bit incautiously: “Be careful what you wish for, Little Bear.  For you 
may get it.” 
 
 
 50.  Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5 n.5. 
 51.  A Dream Is a Wish Your Heart Makes, on WALT DISNEY’S CINDERELLA - ORIGINAL 
SOUNDTRACK (Walt Disney Records 2005). 
